Podílnické společnosti jako předstupeň demokracie: kapitola z dějin veřejné volby
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2012 |
| Druh | Článek v odborném periodiku |
| Časopis / Zdroj | Scientia et Societas |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Obor | Řízení, správa a administrativa |
| Klíčová slova | veřejná politika; public choice; public debt; joint stock company |
| Přiložené soubory | |
| Popis | If we accept the definition that public choice is a process in which the preferences of individuals are combined into collective decisions, then we can regarded joint stock companies of medieval and early modern times as a precursor of the system of representative democracy, at least in terms of practical verification of system functionality elected representatives looking out for the common good. The most important principles of these companies were perpetual succession of shares, the existence of common seal, confirming the corporate will of the shareholders, the management elected by shareholders, internal self-government framing of By-Law, a limited liability company and the shareholder voting rights. This article will therefore be devoted to one of the most important example of the first joint stock company, Genoa Corporation of San Giorgio, which is in the early modern period contributed significantly to governance and balancing private and public interests. |
| Související projekty: |