Limits of truth, assertion, belief and knowledge
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2023 |
| Druh | Vyžádané přednášky |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Popis | Many approaches in philosophical logic solve paradoxes by a revision of logic, but I rather claim that paradoxes show the need for leaving the pre-critical (naive) theories of propositional notions. Critical theories of propositional notions should take into account i. the propositional variant of (generalised) Tarski's theorem (about truth T and necessity), and two theorems delivered in the talk: the first one about assertion and belief, the second one about knowledge. The theorems show 'blind spots' of these propositional notions. |
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