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The value of ideal of a critical discussion is something that should be shared by scientists. It is because in the core of a critical discussion is an inter-subjective evaluation of given propositions, facts, evidence. I will argue that (A) the pursuit of this ideal can also be taken as a possible demarcation criterion for science, at least concerning its demarcation from pseudo-sciences. Pseudo-sciences are characterized as something that wants to be or looks like science, but it is not. Uses of unfounded immunizations are one of the possible signs of pseudo-science (Derksen 1993). In general, immunizations (immunizing strategies or stratagems) prevent for a theory to be falsified or reasonably denied. This concept was initially introduced by Popper (1959/2005) as a conventionalist trick. Popper identified four types: an introduction of ad hoc hypotheses, a modification of ostensive (or explicit) definition, a skeptical attitude as to the reliability of the experimenter, and casting doubt on the acumen of the theoretician. Later, Boudry and Braeckman (2011) provided an overview of immunizing strategies identifying five different types: conceptual equivocations and moving targets, postdiction and feedback loops, conspiracy thinking, changing the rules of play, and invisible escape clauses. They also provided several examples to each type. But more importantly, they presented a definition of immunizing strategies: “[a]n immunizing strategy is an argument brought forward in support of a belief system, though independent from that belief system, which makes it more or less invulnerable to rational argumentation and/or empirical evidence.” Although I do consider immunizations as an indication of pseudo-science, I will argue that (B) immunizations are not arguments as Boudry and Braeckman proposed but rather (C) immunizations are violations of rules of a critical discussion. To support the first part of this claim (B), I will present an analysis of selected examples provided by Boudry and Braeckman using the Toulmin’s model of argument (Toulmin 1958/2003). Regarding the second part (C), I will show that analyses of these examples as violations of rules of a critical discussion in pragma-dialectical theory (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004) is more suitable. In conclusion, immunizations prevent a critical discussion, and therefore reasonable process where inter-subjective evaluation of claims plays a significant role. The evidence, facts, theories and similar are accepted in science by the scientific community, not by individuals. Thus, inter-subjectivity is characteristic for science, and lack of it is typical for pseudo-sciences. Therefore, (A) science can be characterized as an attempt of a critical discussion where the goal is to solve a difference of opinion by reasonable means. References: Boudry, M., & Braeckman, J. (2011). Immunizing Strategies and Epistemic Defense Mechanisms. Philosophia, 39(1), 145–161. Derksen, A. A. (1993). The Seven Sins of Pseudo-Science. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 24(1), 17–42. Popper, K. (1959/2005). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Routledge. Toulmin, S. E. (1958/2003). The Uses of Argument. Cambridge University Press. van Eemeren, F. H., & Grootendorst, R. (2004). A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach. Cambridge University Press.
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