Interakce sociálního a daňového systému a pracovní pobídky
| Title in English | Work incentives and interaction between tax and social systems |
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| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2004 |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Description | The report aimed at monitoring the direct influence of tax and benefit instruments on household incomes. Indicators of financial work incentives are examined for model type families for identifying any undesired influences of taxes and social transfers on peoples work decisions. Marginal effective tax rates (METRs) are calculated in order to show what part of a change in earnings is "taxed away" by the combined operation of taxes, social security contributions (SSCs), and any withdrawal of earnings related social benefits. Three different types of METRs are calculated in order to measure so-called low-wage, unemployment and especially inactivity traps. As one would expect, the likelihood of an inactivity trap is highest for low-skilled workers with low earnings potential, one earner families and families with more dependent children. The risk of low-wage and inactivity trap is higher when means-testing of benefits has played a role. Report is concluded with proposals for future research. This report contributes to the Czech Republic discussion on social security reform, with the aim of increasing employment of people living on welfare. |