Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality

Investor logo
Authors

CORAZZINI Luca COTTON Christopher S LONGO Enrico REGGIANI Tommaso

Year of publication 2024
Type Article in Periodical
Magazine / Source JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
MU Faculty or unit

Faculty of Economics and Administration

Citation
Web https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272724001087
Doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105172
Keywords Multiple public goods, Donor heterogeneity, Crowdfunding, Lab experiment
Attached files
Description We extend a collective action problem to study policy and project selection by heterogeneous groups who prefer to work together on a joint initiative but may disagree on which initiative is best. Our framework, adapted from a model of multiple threshold public goods, presents groups with several mutually exclusive projects, any of which require sufficient support from the group to succeed. Individuals strictly prefer to contribute where and how much they believe others expect of them to ensure joint project success. Groups tend to coordinate on the public good preferred by the wealthiest member, demonstrating a wealthy-interest bias even without corruption, politics, and information asymmetries. At the same time, groups divide costs in highly progressive ways, with the wealthy voluntarily funding a disproportionate share, helping offset the inherent inequality from endowment and selection differences. We discuss applications for policy selection, charitable giving, and taxes.
Related projects:

You are running an old browser version. We recommend updating your browser to its latest version.