Party nomination strategies in flexible-list systems : Do preference votes matter?

Investor logo

Warning

This publication doesn't include Faculty of Economics and Administration. It includes Faculty of Social Studies. Official publication website can be found on muni.cz.
Authors

ANDRÉ Audrey DEPAUW Sam SHUGART Matthew S. CHYTILEK Roman

Year of publication 2017
Type Article in Periodical
Magazine / Source Party Politics
MU Faculty or unit

Faculty of Social Studies

Citation
Web http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1354068815610974
Doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068815610974
Field Political sciences
Keywords candidate list position; flexible-list system; party strategy; preference votes
Description A paradox in the comparative literature on electoral systems is that one of the most common systems in Europe – flexible-list proportional representation systems – may be the least understood. Any study of flexible-list systems must start by acknowledging a puzzle: why candidates spend time and effort striving to win preference votes when typically these votes make no difference between election and defeat. Offering the first comprehensive multi-country test of this key puzzle, we provide evidence from Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia that parties will promote to better list ranks in the next election those candidates who are successful at winning preference votes, thereby improving their prospects of election in the longer term and incentivizing them to cultivate personal reputations. Our findings have important implications for party scholars and practitioners when designing, or reforming, political institutions.
Related projects:

You are running an old browser version. We recommend updating your browser to its latest version.