Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2024 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102526 |
| Keywords | Entitlement effect; Self-selection; Contest; Experiment |
| Description | Leaders who decide the allocation of resources are often chosen through contests. Due to imperfect monitoring, they often decide to allocate resources to themselves at the expense of others. This paper investigates how being selected in a contest affects such allocation through two channels: entitlement and self-selection effects. In our experiment, two players compete for the right to allocate resources between themself and a third, uninvolved player. We identify the entitlement effects by comparing the choices of participants who participated in the contest with those who were chosen randomly. Self-selection effect is identified by comparing the choices of winners and losers between treatments via a difference-in-difference approach. We find a significant effect of entitlement; people participating in the contest transfer fewer resources to the third player compared to those who did not participate. Further, we find no evidence that the people with specific distributional preferences self-select into the leaders’ role. Our findings suggest that the primary reason leaders allocate resources to themselves is their involvement in the contest rather than being a result of self-selection. |
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