Morální intuice v právu – není pak rozhodování subjektivní?
| Title in English | Moral Intuitions in Law - isn't decision-making subjective then? |
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| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2022 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Iurium Scriptum |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Web | Open access článku |
| Keywords | moral intuitions |
| Description | Legal philosophy and theory researches an issue whether in some cases the personality of a judge plays a role in the interpretation and application of law. We know that we have methods of interpretation, some of which may lead to different conclusions, sometimes even completely contradictory ones. Some legal theorists and philosophers mention that moral reasoning also plays a role in this case, and for this reason some then argue that in such cases it is a matter of subjective evaluation and reaction. However, for the most part, this is where the analysis of this issue ends. In this text, however, we will not be satisfied with this and will analyse moral reasoning in more depth. On the basis of this analysis, where we will use the insights of cognitive science, which we will link in particular to the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Wilfrid Sellars, we will then try to explain why we cannot agree that this is a completely subjective decision. |
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