Spojení rozumu a emocí v Aristotelově etice
| Title in English | Connection between reason and emotions in Aristotle's ethics |
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| Year of publication | 2019 |
| Type | Appeared in Conference without Proceedings |
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| Description | In my contribution I will focus on the complicated relationship of reason and emotions in Aristotle's ethical theory, more precisely on the relationship of the deliberative and the desiring part of the soul. I will advocate that the role that Aristotle attributed to these two aspects of the human soul cannot be understood in the same way as the concept of early or late Plato, who describes the relationship of both aspects as more or less competitive, but not even in the same way as the concept of David Hume where reason and sentiment are presented as cooperative but strictly separated. I will argue that Aristotle in defining the moral virtue and other key terms did not consistently distinguish between the deliberative and the desiring aspects of the soul, but works with them as inseparable and devotes considerable effort to the complex interconnection and interaction of the deliberative and desiring part of the soul. Based on several references to contemporary psychology, I will show why I think that this effort was not only well aimed but also that it represents a very valuable (but neglected) moment of Aristotle's ethical writings. |
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