Restrikcionistická výzva a morální intuice
| Title in English | Restrictionist Challenge and Moral Intuitions |
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| Year of publication | 2015 |
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| Description | Ongoing research in moral psychology shows that moral intuitions play a crucial role in everyday moral judgement. This is an answer to the question (i.e. How moral judgement works?) that is asked in the framework of a descriptive attempt to understand morality. However, the really important question (i.e. Should we rely on moral intuitions?) lies in the normative sphere and is left mainly unanswered (for example by Jonathan Haidt, but also by other moral psychologists). The situation is even more serious due to the fact that it concerns the core of philosophical method – moral intuitions are (mainly within the analytic tradition) used as an evidence for or against particular normative ethical theories or claims. One group of experimental philosophers (so-called restrictionists) that focuses on the practice of appealing to intuitions mainly in epistemology offers reasons why this practice should be restricted (so-called restrictionist challenge). What these reasons are? And are they applicable to the moral intuitions as well? Long story short: Are moral intuitions a reliable epistemic source? |
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