Explicating the Notion of Truth Within Transparent Intensional Logic
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2014 |
| Type | Article in Proceedings |
| Conference | Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Web | http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-06080-4_12 |
| Doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06080-4_12 |
| Field | Philosophy and religion |
| Keywords | truth; Transparent Intensional Logic |
| Description | The approach of Transparent Intensional Logic to truth differs significantly from rivalling approaches. The notion of truth is explicated by a three-level system of notions whereas the upper-level notions depend on the lower-level ones. Truth of possible world propositions lies in the bottom. Truth of hyperintensional entities – called constructions – which determine propositions is dependent on it. Truth of expressions depends on truth of their meanings; the meanings are explicated as constructions. The approach thus adopts a particular hyperintensional theory of meanings; truth of extralinguistic items is taken as primary. Truth of expressions is also dependent, either explicitly or implicitly, on language (its notion is thus also explicated within the approach). On each level, strong and weak variants of the notions are distinguished because the approach employs the Principle of Bivalence which adopts partiality. Since the formation of functions and constructions is non-circular, the system is framed within a ramified type theory having foundations in simple theory of types. The explication is immune to all forms of the Liar paradox. The definitions of notions of truth provided here are derivation rules of Pavel Tichý's system of deduction. |
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